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UTAH UTAH SUPRt:ME Ce>UR:r 
DOCUMENT 
I<FU 
~5.9 
;gCKET NO.s---~.___--.,lt 
IN THit 
SUPREME COUR. T 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
C. G. RENSHAW, 
Plaintiff and Hespondent, 
vs 
TRACY LOAN & TRU~; L' COMPANY, 
a Corporation, as Receiver for 
'VALKER BROTHFJRS DRY GOODS 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
D<>fPJJdant an(l AppPllaut. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff brings his action in two counts against 
the defendant receiver, claiining that the plaintiff 
is <'lltitll~d to [;(• treated us a preferred claimant in 
the n'cein•rship proceedings, growing out of ibe 
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fail me of t hP \V alhr Brothers Dry Goods Com-
pany a corporation. '!'here is no distinction be-
' . tween the two couuts; tho evidence and the law Is 
the same as to each. 'l'here is no dispute as to tlw 
facts in the case as then~ is no conflict in the evi-
dence, and 110 evidence was introduced on behalf of 
the dc~fendant. It seems also to be conceded that 
the plaintiff has proven all the facts alleged in 
plaintiff's complaint, as alleged therein, and con-
sequently it follows that if the plaintiff's complaint 
stntes a cause of action plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover in accordance with the prayer of his com-
plaint. 
Plaiutiff a'< a boy eleven years of age entered 
Hw Pmploy of Wallu~r Brothers Dry Goods Com-
}Jany, and coutiuued in its employ for a period 0f 
38 years and until the business was wound up under 
the direction of the receiver. 
~OO!l after he entered the emplovnwnt as a 
. ' 
young boy, and encouraged by the management of 
the company so to do, and in accordance with the 
custom of other employees, Renshaw began to de-
posit, out of his earnings, small amounts of money 
with Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company, and 
continued ·so to do until Novemb(~r 20, 1928; that 
datP is significant because in the latter part of 
November, ]928, thl' ownership and management of 
\Valk(ol' Brotl1ers Dry Goods Company changed and 
Mr. Dreyfous became tlw active manager and the 
controlling forcQ in HlP company. 
\Vhile the plaintiff and Miss Salisbury, who 
as;;;igned to plaintiff the second cause of action, 
were making these deposits, and afterwards 
throughout the management of Mr. Walker and Mr. 
Dreyfous, and almost to the day of the appointment 
of the receiver, the plaintiff and Miss Salisbury 
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were assured, through the officers of the Dry Goods 
Company, that Uwy had nothing to worry about and 
that their money was allsolutely safe; that th(·y 
could draw their money at any time, and that if any-
thing ever h;~ppcned to the store they would be paid 
in preference to anyone. 
Mrs. Chase, who had direct control over receiv-
ing deposits from the employees, testified that aft~::_· 
Mr. Dreyfous assumed control Miss Salisbury 
wanted to draw some money, and Mr. Dreyfous told 
}\! rs. Chase to tell Miss Salislmry not to worry; her 
mcncy was perfectly safe and she would receive it, 
aml that the'cmployl'Cs werl~ entitll~d to a preference 
nnrl their money was perfectly safe. (Ails. 23). 
The plaintiff testified that he believed the state-
ments to be> true, and relied upon these statements 
made to him, and that it was by n~ason of these 
statements so made that he continued to make r1e-
posits ·with th~· company and allowed his money to 
remain on deposit there. 
During the time of these deposits by the em-
ployees and until the coming of Mr. Dreyfous, the 
comp:llly invested in tim(~ certifictl te:i of deposit 
an amount of nwm~y equal to or greater than tltc 
amount on deposit from the employees; or if the 
amount of th~ cprtificatcs clid not equal or exceecl 
the amount of snch deposit~,, there was a special 
account at the Contiucnt:1l l'Tational Bank of ar: 
amount sufficient to make up the deficiency. 
These certificntr•s ancl this special account were 
to tnlw care of anything in an enH~rgcncy, and as 
testified to hy Mr. ·walker, the only obligations that 
the company had that didn't have a due date wen· 
these special ~;ccounts of employees; an employee 
could put money in today and draw it out tomorrow 
4 
or next week, and get 6 percent interest, without ~:.o­
tiee. All the other liabilities had stated dates. Our 
invoices for merchandise purchased, had dating 
.as did any other account; all had certain dating, 
and money from the Lank, all due on a certain datt. 
'l'ht•se ~<pecial accounts (employees accounts) ha-l 
no date whatever; all due on demand. We had those 
special deposits there to take care of the spedDl 
accounts and other items, as I stated before. 'rhose 
special accounts were the only liability we had thnt 
was due on demand. (Abs. 7G-78). 
MrR. Chase testified that these time certificates 
were always a great deal more than the amoun: on 
depoE:it from employ<•es, and that the time cer1itl-
cat<~s as :-:he was told by Mr. \Yalker were to cove;· 
any emergency that they needed, and by emergency 
"·as meant that she could draw out of this em~"g­
eHcy m01w~· to pay the employee depositors if tlwy 
had to do that; that if she couldn't flraw it out of 
the chPekinoh· account that th<~se tim(• ccrtificah~s 
' ' con~<tituted a special account out of wl1ich she could 
pay the employ<'PS their dPposits. (Abs. 29). 
Walker Brothers Dr~,- Goods Company, unlil 
th<' coming- of Drcyfous, hpt these deposits in the 
w•nem 1 lNlg-er undPr the lwadi n~~ first of "On Dt•-
posit" and later of "Cash Due Employees," but 
aft0r Mr. Dr0yfous took th<' management lw list<,d 
in th<' lPdg-<'r Ow naiYl" of each employee deposit-
jng-. ( Ahs. ~4). 
At thP tinw of tl10, appointm<'nt of the receiwr, 
the tob 1 amount due to the employec~s was $11,778.73, 
of which amount $11,222.74 was due to Henshaw a11d 
Miss Salisbury, and tlw balance of $556.04 was due 
to six other employee:-; in nmounts yaryin::.; from 
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~33.76 due to one employee to $144.50, due another 
employee. 
Plaintiff's contention is that the employees <JO 
'depositing arC' 0ntitled to payment in full in prefer-
ence to those claiming for merchandise sold, and 
other creditors. The common creditors have been 
paid approximately 45 percent of their claims, ar.d 
unless plaintiff is adjudged a preferred creditor he 
will receive only approximately 45 percent of the 
amount due him, while if he is adjudged a preferred 
creditor he vvill be paid in full the amount of his 
claim. 
There is no dispute as to the amount of the 
plnintiff's claim, the claim having been approved as 
a common claim in the full amount. 
In appellant's brief there is a more detailed 
statc>tm0Ttt 1of facts, and of such statement the T8~ 
spondent does not complain. 
ARGUMI~NT 
The plaintiff Renshaw, went to work for vVa.lkcr 
Brothers Dry Goods Company when he was hut 
eleven years of age. It was, and continued to be 
through two generations of t1le Walker Brothers, a 
large retail department store in Salt Lake City, and 
undoubtedly Ren~haw .as a young boy soon learnrd 
to look to his employers for advice, and whE>n they, 
as was their custom at the time, advised and E-n-
couraged their Nnployces to deposit thE>ir savings 
•with the company, to let it accumulate and be added 
.to, the boy ·was only too anxious to comply with the 
suggestion. 
vValker Brothers in financial circles in Salt Lake 
City, has always beeu a name to conjure with on 
financial matters; and let us say here that for twc· 
generations vValker Brothers did not betray that 
confidence. 
'l'here >vas a fiduciary relation existing between 
plaintiff and vValker Brothers Dry Goods CornpaPy 
of a very tender and !,trusting nature; the hoy, 
eleven years of age, on one side, and these master 
merchants in control of the company on the other 
side. 'l'he plaintiff looked up to, trusted and reliPd 
on tlw officers of the Dry Goods Company. He had 
absolute confidPnce in their int~~grity and fidelity, 
and thought rathr~r of the good faith than the legd 
obligation in hi~'· dealings with them; and when this 
fiduciary rPlation exists lwtwN'n the parties, if a 
wronp; arises, the same rr~I1~ 1''ly E'Xl~:ts against tl1o 
wrongdoer on he half of thP principal, as woukl l:X. 
ist n~·ninst tl1P trnstc>r on hC'half of the cestui fJUP 
hust. The rc>lation may exist under a great varic,:y 
-of circurnstanc('S. It exists i.n nil CHYPS wlwrP thn(~ 
hm:: hPc>n a spc>cial confidt>ncl' rc>posc>d in one who in 
e0nitv and goocl. consciencr is hound to act in g·ono 
faith, f\no '.-Yi1h dm• J'('g':l nl to tl1c intNests of Hw 
one> n•posing the coufidf•nce. Tt arises wlH'l'PVCl' :1 
trn'-1t continnrmsly or te>mporarily is spe>cially TE'-
pnsef! in thr skill or ining-rity of another. 
Cnnrh of Pquit.v have refused to set any bounds 
to th0 c.ircnrnstancPs ont of which a fiduciary n'la-
fion rrw~· spring-. Tt not only includes all legal re-
lations hnt it 0xt0n(lr, to rvrry possible casr in which 
a .fiduciary r0lntinn exists in fnct, and in "·hich tlv:re 
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is confidence reposed on one side and resulting dom-
ination and influence on the other. 
25 Corpus Juris, Page 1119. 
In the case at bar it is peculiarly applicable 
by reason of the supNior intelligence of the ern-
ployer over the employee of tender years, and tho 
master's superior knowledge of the facts involv<?d 
in the business transaction. 
A very recent case illustrating this fiduciary 
relation and the consequcmt duty of the ma.ste ... 
arising out of this relationship of master and ser-
vant, is the case of 
Kimbr.Il v. General Electric Company, 
23 (2d) Pac., Page 295, 
before the District Court of Appeals, Third District, 
California, and decided June 16, 19~~3. The plain-
tiff in that cas(~ recovered dumngec against the de-
ft~ncbnt colllpany for injn• ir~s receivc~(l by th<> plain-
tiff on account of the negligent act of Dean \Vils(JJl, 
an employPe of tlw General IDlcctl·jc Company. 'J'he 
injmies WHo received by plaintiff in March, 1928 ar1d 
the ccmplaint was not filed agajnst the ddendP.nt 
company until July, l ~)i\0; and the' fkfendant inter-
pose(} thP defense of the Statute of Limitation.s. 
The plaintiff reli('d upon frnm1ulent acts of conce~ll 
ment for the purpose of tolling the statute. 
At the time of the injury, t11(' pbintiff was 111 
the ~mploy of tl~t~ Pacific Gas & Electric Comp:>.-ry 
(not of t11e defc:n<lnnt) ns an electrician and generd 
power-house workman at a particular pmver plant 
operated by Raid Pnci:fic Gas & El~ctric Company. 
On the' fb.\T of the injury, the dPfendant company 
was engaged in repairing a part of the power phnt 
where plaintiff vnts ,,~orking and had in its employ 
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in making such repairs, Dean Wilson. Plaintiff did 
not know and had no means of knowing that Dean 
-Wilson was in the employ of the defendant comp~my, 
nor did he know that the defendant company was 
making the repairs at the power plant. If there 
were no other facts, it would be difficult to see how 
plaintiff could succeed in the action and why the plea 
of the Statute of Lilllitations would not be good. 
But Dean Wilson had been in the employ of the 
Pacific Gas & Eleetric Company for a long time 
prior to the accident, nnd had been a fellow-servar.t 
of the plaintiff. At the time of the accident the 
plaintiff believed that Dean Wilson was his fellow-
servant and \W,s in tlw employ of the Gas & :h;ll'c-
tric company and not ill the employ of the defendLi.nt 
company; but the fact was, that Dean 'Wilson had 
been loaned to the dPfemlant company under eir-
cumstancPs making Dean vVilson an employ('() of th(! 
defendant company on the day of thP accident, fl.nd 
1 he injury occurred by rca''Oll o !' Wilson's negligence 
\Yhile h<> was thus an emplo)"Pe of th(~ defendant 
cmnpa!l)'. 'l'lw plaintiff, 'in his ig·norancc, procc0dd 
and rPcovered compensation undE~r the workman's 
compPnsation act against hi:~ Pmployer and after f'O 
n•cove>ring ami after the Rtatntc~ of Limitations had 
rnn, ]Jp diRCO\'PrPd that vViJson V"aS an employee of 
tltn dr•fpmlant company and that then~ had been au 
nndf'rst~'nding- betwccPn H10 d(~fendant company and 
plaintifr'-., employer nnrlr>r wl!ich plaintiff mig·ht he 
p0rmitt(•rl to go on with tlw proceedings under tlw 
wo:·kman 's cornrwnsation act, recover the award, 
rnd tlwt the defendant company should pay half of 
surh ~w."n_rd. Plaintiff then planted suit against the 
dr•f<'ndant company to recover for the injury, and 
pleaded the above facts to toll the Statute of Limi-
tations. The court helrl that by reason of the fidu-
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ciary reln.tion existing between plaintiff and his em--
ploycr1 the Ga~.; & }i;!ectric Company; that the law 
impo.,;ecl upon tl1e ma~ter the duty ~when plaintiff 
wns injun~d, t.'J llnvc~ disclosed to plaintiff the fact 
•}mt \Vj}t;on '"•"as in the employ of the defendnTtt 
company and that it was a fraud upon plaintiff for 
tlte master 1:0t to so disclose the liability of Uw 
ddcnd:mt cmnpany and that the defendant company 
participated in the fraud, and that the plaintiff has 
hi:-; opportu11it)r after discovcr:ng the fraud to bring 
his action against tlw clefendaut company. 
The case· hc•twtifully illustrates the doctrine that 
~he master mud exercise' the utmost good faith to-
ward the• SE'rva11t, ancl the dc~fendant entering into 
an arrangement with the> ma:;ter to breach that duly, 
became a .. participator in the frnud and could rwp 
no advantage from the frauduleut agreement. 
''Being an Pmployee of the Pacific Gas & 
Electric Company, a relation of trust and 
onnficlencr existed bdv.·een that company 
and plaintiff. It is unnecessary to cite au-
thoritie;:; to tlw pffpct that, wlwrever a rela-
iion of trmt aml confidence exists a full dis-
closure of all tbe facts and circumstancr's 
necessary to show who \Yas lin.blo for the 
injury suffcn'd by tho plaintiff should han~ 
lwen madl' by the Pacific Gas & ElPetric 
CGmpanv. rl 1his di:-'cloP.urc was not made to 
tllc~ pluiHtiff nor doe' th~~ n~cord show that 
it was made to the ltHlustrinl Accident 
Commission. Th(' rc>conl sl10ws throurrh ' , .., 
the negotiatiow< therein set forth, that the 
0f'nNa] Electric Company was advised of 
wlmt \vas h0ing· dono by t1w Pacifi~c Gas & 
Electric CorqJany, and by rr~ason of the pri-
vity sho\;·n to lmvo existPd between them, 
and payrn<'nl of one-half of the exprnses. 
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that the General Electric Company ratified 
and approved what was being done by the 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company. These are 
inferences which, from the circumstances 
disclosed hy the record, the jury was fully 
warranted in drawing.'' 
- Page 299, second column. 
A petition for rehearing was filed in the case, 
and the opinion disposing of the petition is found 
in 23 Pacific (2d) at page~ 1075, and there the court 
in denying the petition for rehearing re-asserted the 
doctrine that the "master must exercise good fni1 h 
toward the servant and make full disclosun~ of mat-
i r>rs affecting servant's fina.ndia1 weJfare 1arising 
out of, anrl rlepPndent upon, the relationship.'' 
So in the casP at bar it was the duty of th;) 
managcmr>nt of \Valker Brothers Dry Goods Com-
pany, when it began to make large expPnditures in 
permanent impron•nw11ts, thm~ conv0rting liquid as-
f-:ets into fro"'en assets, to have a(lvised these em-
ployeef-: having mmwy on deposit with the company 
to withdraw th('ir money, and that there was dangPr 
that th<• company would not b0 in a position to pay 
thnm promptly if demnnrl wns made for the retui'n 
of th0 rleposits. 
H was th0 rlu1y of thP master to make a full 
rlisclosnrP of matters thus affecting the sprvant's 
finanri;d \\'Plfnxc ~n·ising out of, ancl dependent upoH 
iheir n•IMions; but the Dry Goods Company instead 
of C'urh full disclosure, and instead of looking after 
1 hP F\<>rvant's financial welfare, reassured the em-
plovPe:c nf the safety of their money; that they had 
nothing to worry about; that they would get tht•ir 
m01wy, every cPnt; that it was absolutely safe, h-
cause of tl1e solvency of thP company, and more tha.n 
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that, because their deposits had a preference over 
all other claims cxcl•pt those of a similar nature; 
that the plaintiff \vould be paid in full in preference 
to the wholesalers of merchandise dealing ·with the 
company; this the plaintiff relied upon and had a 
right to rely on the statemcmts corning through :Mrs. 
Chase from the management of the company. 
·when the company failed to make such dis-
closure anl failed in any way to consider the ser-
vant's :finai1cial welfare, and thought only of their 
own selfish aims, fraud wns committccl on this plain-
tiff and the other employoes, and the defendant 
nhoulcl be hPld strictly as a trustee; and plaintiff's 
claim should be paid in full. 
A case much relied on by counsel appearing in 
thL' lower court in opposition to plaintiff's claim, but 
who have not appeared in this court, is the case of 
Tucker v. Linn, et al., 57 Atl., 1017, and cited at 
page ~8 of appellant's hrid. It was claimed that 
that case was on all-fours with llw case nt bar rwd 
that the court took a viow contrary to plaintiff's 
position. It wns before tho Court of Char~cNy of 
New Jors0y, and appears to he an opinion rendered 
orally by the r:J'rial Court in Hl04. 
Let us Pxmnine the case somPwhat in clt•tail, 
b<>caw;c wltih the c:ist' is not at all in point, it coH-
tains a sig;lifiei1Jit dieturn. 'rho bill charged tlw.t 
during the years 1ED5 and 1898 thr compbin:mt 
"ph:cecl the sum of $1,840.00 in the hands of the 
defendant, .Jo}m Linn, for investment in such se-
curitiPs as he might deem safe, and for the carr.', 
custorly·. nwml!!;cnwnt, and control for her of such 
folccnrii.iPs after th~ investment of the said money; 
that the said .1<,Jm Linn, acting as attorney of and 
trustee for the coJnplainant, thereupon took the <'11-
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tire charge of said moneys and investments, until 
the death of the said .John Linn which occurred in 
' the year 18~J8; that at the time of his death the s?-id 
John Linn had in his possession, as attorney as 
afore~aid, and held in tru:,;t for the complainant, ;;he 
~aid sum of $1 ,840.00, or the securities representing 
the sanw, togetlwr with the accrued intereist or 
diviclrnds then•on. 
'l'ltis bill clt>arly sots forth an express trust, and 
if the proof sustained the allegations there is uu 
question whatever but what the complainant would 
he. entitled to recover the trust property. But she 
entirely fr'.ilr>d in l1er proof, and if she made :Jl'Y 
case that is at nll to be compared to the, c:1se at bn.r, 
it was a case altognther dif-ferent from the c::>."<=' 
all0,g"<'d in her lJill. 'I'hc complainant was emnlo~·ed 
in the cnpacitY of working housrkeeper, and th0re 
was somn c•vidence that thp master ]u~d retaim'd 
$840.00 unfler some unfl,•rstanr1:n!! or arrm~gemPnt 
with hc>r. 'rh0 Chwct>l1or in hs '~ral opinirm :on;:;: 
that in his ,infhmwnt. thrr0 i~\ :m 0ntir0 failure to 
provP tlH' particular equitahl0 cnu';0 of nctiou 'dt;ch 
is s0t forth in the l)ill of complaint. 
Aft0r disposing of thr: contNttion of comp1din-
ant, the Chancellor sflys: 
"I flo not finrl H:nt thPI'<' i" rtny lang11age 
th"i innif':d0;..: that Mr. Linn at anv time 
assnmerl any otlwr n•lation than that of 
f10 1•ior to the cnmplninant." 
Rnt af1pr rliscus;.:ing th(> case set out in the hill, 
nnrl nrions qn<•stions of an express tru;.:t, the Vice-
ChancPllor, apparently ·with something in mind very 
11Hlf'h d::in to th<"· casp no\\' b0fore this Court, says~ 
"On one point I flo not wish to be misun-
drrstood. I am not dealing· with a cas0 wlwre 
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relations of trust and confidence- fidu-
ciary relations of any kind whatever exist-
illg prior to the transaction under investi-
gation- eli~ place legal contracts and legal 
rights Ly equities of various kind::;, and 
hence give rise to equitable rernedies. 
In this case, the complainant does not 
set forth that she was induced to en-
ter i!1to a h~gal contract with Mr. Linn 
hecam;e of any such pre-existing relations 
of collfidt·nCl', all(l on that grouml pray that 
such legal contract be set ac;i<le>, and htc:r 
equitable• r1ght" growing out of n•lations of 
confidrmce enforce(l. The case, in this re-
spoct, SP(~ms to be sub:;tnntially on all-fours 
with Culch v. Fosdick, ~mel the> sole founda-
tion of th(~ complainant 'r' nll<'gcd equity is 
to be foun(l in the contract 1tse1f- the con-
tract "·hich t11e complainant and Mr. Linn, 
acting at arm's-length, saw fit to mnke. It 
i" the nature of the contract itself, assuming 
the partie,:; to lw fully cnpnblc of contract-
ing with each otlwr upon terms of 0qnnlity, 
upon which complainant's cbim for equit-
able n•lief i" basPd. R0g:urlin[(" the cnse 
strictly in this light, and giving the> .a-rcatf'.cf 
pos::;ihlP forrc> to the dortrinr rnuncintrd hv 
the Cl1tmc01lor, in Gutch v. Fosclick, I fn;1 
to finrl tlmt tJ>rse two r>n.rtic>s in fact made: 
anv bnrg::~in which cit1wr or tlH•m sunposed 
crr>ntrd any otJ1r:r rrlation than tl1n dr>finite 
JP~nl relation of dehtor and creditor." 
'rhe Cfli"l' c:m lwrdl~' he stated to be a case on 
all-fours agninc;t thr, plaintiff an(1 in favor of thr 
dcfenrJant. IrH~ce(1, it is a case that tells rather for 
the plaintiff awl flgainst the narrow contention of 
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the defendant, that the court is without authority 
to grant the relief that appe1als strongly to anyone's 
conscience. rrhe Chancellor, when he made his com-
ments above quoted, must have had in mind a case 
:-;omewhat similar to the one at bar, of the master 
importuning, advising, inviting, and perhaps com-
manding his employec>s to save their 'wages by de-
positillg with tlw mac:h~r for safe keeping and in-
crease, and in such a case the Vice-Chancellor seems 
to say a different situation would he created, and 
one that would appeal to the jurisdiction of tht> 
court of ertuity, and one ·where tl1e court coulrl rr~­
lieve the ('mployPes rlealing ,,-ith the master, not at 
arm's-length, hut almost as confiding children rP1y-
ing upon the superior knowlelge, capacity and wis-
~lom of tlw master. 
The statenwnts of the Chancellor, after he held 
that then• was no evi]prJcc whatever to sustain +he 
a1legatio11:-; of the complaint, an-~ dicta. All his di.s-
eus:-·don of tlw law with refc1·once to tracing pror-
crty is fllllh~ immaterial to t]w cast', and H> are l1w 
ChmJc(•llor':-; n·marks as ahovp quot0d in this brief, 
hut if \\'(• arf' tc consid0r the obiter· at all, that qu .'· 
tation ahoYe ir. this brief se<>rns rtnite pertinent to 
thn f'll!l~'iil<~ration of tl:e qlwstion at bar ]n this cnf'.~, 
aw-l h(• :'eems to say that a case similar to the nne 
'''P h:n-P, ought to nppNll to th· conscience of th,~ 
Oonrt· or Ch<1neer~v. 
Th· npp0l1ant. 011 pag<: 14 of it>< bri0f, s(•ems to 
cnrrer1l:,· m:c1Prl't:md om· position that because the 
rrolntion of ma;e;t<•r anrl servant existed between the, 
)1]nintiff H]](l ·walker Brotlwrs Dry Goods Company 
1lwt P fiduciary, or conldential, rdation:-::hip 
0xist0rl. lwtwN~n them, and that we rdied npon that 
fiduciary relatiom;hip. But immediately, on pnge 
15, and for the follovYi11p; 1 f) pages of appPllant 's 
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brief, that proposition and contention on the part 
of the respondent is entirely ignored and the appel-
lant discusses the relationship as if no fiduciary re-
lation existcc1; as if plaintiff and Walker Brothers 
Dry Goods Company were strangers and dealing at 
arm's-longth. He quotes and im;c:rts in capital let-
ters on page 15 of the brief, the followi ug: 
''A constructive t ru~,;t, or as frequently 
called, an involuntary trust. is a fiction of 
equity, dr:vised to tlte ellCL: that the cquit-1-
hle n'll'('rlies available against a conven-
tional fiduciary JJltty be available under the 
smnr~ name- and process against one who 
through fraud or mistnke, or by another 
mean~ ex nwlcflcio ac(]nires property of 
another." 
Then he procm'ds to say that it is obvious that 
francl is one of the npcessary elements in order to 
cnn11lr- a court to raisP a c,::;;.,:Jructiw• trn;-;t. But tht)' 
quotation docs not hear him out. Counsel entirely 
ignores tlw first h:11 f of the quotation, where it says 
tlmt a fiction is devi:"ed to the end that the equitabls 
rcrnedie~> available againr.t a conventi ona] fiduciary 
may he available against those prarticing fnmd in 
cPrtain cases. 
'rho c•mstruetiv2 trm~t ari~irw out nf fn~ud, 
mistake, or ~~ny ~1ther mern:; ex maleficio is crc::ne,J 
as a fiction of law in ore},,,. to giv(' to the injured 
party the equitable n•merlie~; available against the 
fiduciary an in tlH' rnsc: at bnr, by reason of the 
.rdationc;hip of mnst':r and s0rvant, the plaintiff nnd. 
"\Valb•r Brothc:1s Dr.v Goods Company held that re-
lationsllip of convc•ntional fiduciary. The whole dis-
cussion of apn,.•lJant on pages 15 to 30 inclusive, iB 
bnE'ecl on ignoring· tlmt fiduciary relation. Appellant 
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does not attempt to show that a fiduciary relation 
does not exist and tlE.tt its consequences do not fol-
low but goes upon the as:o;umption that as it does 
not exist then certain thiugs follow and certain 
things must he prov<'B. While we claim that ~Walker 
.Brotlwrs Dry Uoous Company were guilty of con-
structive frauu by reason of its failure to disclose 
'io the plaintiff certain thi11gs, that <luty ou the part 
of ~Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company exi~>ted 
solely by reasou of the J"elalionsllip, by reason of 
the duty of mm;ter growing out of that relationship. 
vVe do not claim that that duty was due to ev~~r7 
person dealing ~with \Valhr Brothers Dry Gowl::: 
Company, nor to a stranger dealing at arm's-lcn:c,rf:h 
with tile compn.ny. We, aro 11ot claiming that tlte 
Ln~ach of Uw contmet ])etWC<'ll strangers, won!d 
convert the l<'gal obligation to pay for such brench 
iuto a construct.in~ trust giving rise to equitnth~ 
n~nwdi<'s. 'I'll{~ fJlaintifl' has never mad(' any snell 
conV,ntion so that tlw autl10rities citcf1 llv connc:c·l 
are besidl' tllf' quPstion. 
Upon m•rta.iu questiom; of com;tructive trmotf', 
anthori til'~' a r,~ nmch di vidc:<l, ~wd coul'ts might well 
tak<• O}Jpo~:it<• \'iPv\':' on ~:onw question::; illvolvecl in 
that suhjl~et. For <>xnmple, the case of Bhdc•y v. 
nri:J:~OII, 52 ~U]l!"('11J(' C'omt Hqlortnr 51G, 28() U. 8. 
2:J4, is such n c;H';' \Yll~'tP M ;·. Jn:;ticf' ~trllw vl':·~· 
frnnkh· c:tatf•:-; that 0!(' cm1trarv view is not without 
''unpo;·J. Bnt tlw npywll:>nt 1~ not concNnPrl wi'h 
l11;• doc' rinp inyo]y:•d in BlakPy v. Brinson. 'T'iw 
qu0stiou tlw r<~ was not heh\'Pen mast0r anrl servant 
YJo'· hd\\'('('ll any oth<'r fi<luciaries. It was solely 1:. 
mlf':-:tion hPt"·<'ell tlw bank (\!J onn sid<· and its cred-
itor :Jn 11lP otL<T, ns to wh(•j]Jp:· cPrta]n false m•d 
frnndul(•nt n•presl·nhtions of /the officers of the 
'hank to thP <'f'fl·ct that tlil' lmnk had purchased cer-
tain l)oncls for its dPpo:-;itor :: nd had t~du:n tbe pay 
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from the dcposltor oy charg-ing his account, whether 
such a fraud created a trust on the part of the baHk 
or \Ylwtlwr it could be held only in an action at law 
for a breach of contract. Many courts would have 
reached the conclmsion that uudcr the facts given 
in that case that the bank should be held as a trustee 
for ilto:-~c boll(h;, or have the value of them if they 
were not forthcomiug. But as heretofore stated 
the respondent in Uris case is uot concerned >vith 
whether that case in the Supreme Court of the 
United States was rightfully or wrongfully deter-
mined. It has no b(~al'ing on the case at bar. 
Appelhmt cites many c1wcs including 46 Utah 
1, and 73 Utah '104, to tlw effect that legal fraud 
mu~;t lJc f()Ull(lccl on a mi~rc•Jn·c,wntation of past 
or present facts and that promisef; as to future acts 
or conditions can not form a basis of the fraud or 
d(•cPit cknge. A.'.?,'ain c<n1m:()l is (liscussing a propo-
sition wherE' the parti('s ~~i" dealing at arm's-length 
and 1Ylwrc tlH·n~ is no relation of conftdence im-
'(JO.''ing upnn tlJp 0110 party the utmost good faith 
m transactions with the other. 
"Actual or intc•ntional fraud is not nec~'S­
i'ary, nor is it nece~;s:uy that any nxpre~',; 
or conventional trust relation shall cxi::t 
between tlw pn rti'"1, or that any promise 
Rlwll hnvr~ henn rnnr!c• 1Jy th,. one for the 
hcnP:fit of tlH• oH;c•r, LnL n.s a gmwral prin-
cinle, a constructive trust will arise 
\Yhonrv(•r tlH• ei rrurnshner>s under which 
pronrfty wns acquired make it in-
equitable thlt it Fhonld be retained by him 
w110 holds tl1c leg-al tith~, as ag-ainst another, 
pro\'icled :;umn confidential relation exists 
brtween the tl\'o, and provided the raising 
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of a trust is necessary to prevent a failure 
of justice.'' 
65 C. J., 456. 
-Where 1wrsons are in .a fiduciary relation, 
and an advantage is gained by the one over 
the other, by rea:,on of such relation, it is 
of no eonse<JUence that no fraud was in-
tended. Consunwrs Co. v. Parker 227 Ill. 
' App. 552. 
\Vhere two persons stand in such relation 
that confidence is necessarily reposed by 
one in tlH• other, and an inftnonce whic}~ na-
turally grows out of that confidence is 
abused while such confidence continues or 
an advanta~;e is ohtainPd by reason of such 
influence over th0 confiding; party, the per-
son seeking· such advantage will not be 
ywnnitte<l to retain it; and this is true re-
g-ardl<~ss of tlw exist1.-llC\' of nchml fraud, 
undue inflnr>nce, or coerc>m, nnd even 
though tlw transaction c011'(1 not haYr> lK~<'n 
imrwach<~d. if such confir1c>n1ial n~btion hacl 
not exist<•d. Pulfrey v. \Vi<l. 1 n N. E. 87, 
240 Ill. 5;);~; Hou~wwrigl1t v. Rteinkc, ] :JS 
Tll. 1:18, :~2G IlL :~98; RelmffPr v. LntehPr, 
22fi P. :184-, 0~l Old. 188. 
It is not ~h0 position of th0 r<'spm1dn1t that 
1hr• r~';~rl'sPnta+ion,; rn:tdn throug:lt 1\hl'. Cha~w to 
tho <•mpl<n'('<':' 1 !tat tlH•ir money waf' absolutdy saf~: 
nml thnj it would h0 paid in pn~ference to any other 
daim was false, or frau<hduntly m:-ul0, but quile 
thP cmd rary our eont0ntion is ~llld always has been 
that tlH• r0prP~Pntations wc•re honc~-;tly madp an!l 
that tlwy \\·Nc' 1 mtltful nnd quitP accuratdy stated 
to _tlw employees. 'I'lH· finding~; of tlw lo\H~l' court 
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justify the position that Mrs. Chase was entirely 
right in making the representations and the re-
spondent is confident that this court will vindicate 
her position. Respondent's complaint is that the 
master did not disclose to the plaintiff and to the 
other employees the precarious position of their 
deposits when the master was investing a large 
.amount of liquid assets into improvements on the 
store buildiJJg, when it was for the financial welfare 
of its employees to withdraw thPir money and take 
it el:se\vh0r0. Im:tend of so p(•rforming- it:s duty the 
master lull0(l its employee:s into a sense of false 
security. 
'l'he only (]Uestion, otlwr than as to whether 
there \Vas a trust relationship hc·twcen the plaintiff 
and the 'Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company, dis-
cussed by appellant, is as to whether or not the 
trust funds haY<' lw(m traced or earmarked so as 
to rntitile plaintiff to a prr>ference; that question 
is di~·cussed on pages 31 1 o 4-6 inclusive of appel-
lad's brief and such discm;sion in appellant's brief 
is exactly the same as appellant's dif'cussion of the 
same question at pagPs 3G to 50 of appellant's brief 
in the case of .J. R. Wnlker. 11laintifP and respond-
Pn1, v. Tracy Loan & rrrust CompanY, c·tc. C''''e No. 
;i:-l~R in this cow·t. Mr. Moyl<>, in hiP briPf on be-
kllf of :r..r r. ·walker in that case, beginning- at nngc 
57, effectually answen~ the npp0llant nnon this 
question and 'it will not hn nPCef':o:flry for th2 pl8.in. 
t;ff in this cnse to r0;K·at ~J~·. M(rYlc 's argument 
rpon this pha~e. of the cn~o. The court will remern-
h0r that the vVr1 lkor C.'1."8 heretofore argued and 
3uhmitte>d in this C(lurt was tried in the lower court 
at the same time and made the same record as was 
made in the cnc:r> now bdore this court and that th•' 
rr·cord in the \\'alker case and in the Renshaw case 
i:-; id0ntica l. If the funds wnc• traced in the Walker 
20 
C'ase, they were traced in the Renshaw ca~e. There 
is no clifi\~n~ncu in t1H• two cases upon this question 
bdore this court. There is a diffenmce between 
the two Ctl~PS DS to t1w tlwory of tJw trust and J1!C 
facts upon wl1ich the trust is predicated, but oth0r-
wise the cases are identical. 
The money depositc~d by plaintiff was not ear-
markQd nor kept sqmratn and apart from all other 
mone.\- cmning into the hands of the Walker Br,)-
tlwr~ Dry Good~' Company, hut it has never h<wn 
the doctrine of this ~tat<~ that it must be. 'J'he 
:mmwy ,,-as n•ganlcd by \Yalk(•r Brotlwrs Dry 
Goods Company as a trust fund and so trNlt<:<l so 
long ns the ~Walker fmnil_v controllrd the Dry Goods 
Company. Tl:ere was always inve~ted in time C2l'·· 
tificat<'s a sufficient amount of rnml<'Y avnihhl<~ fo1· 
the rmynH•nt of the <kposits of plaintiff anrl others 
f'imilar1y situat0d, and contirnwd to be ''0 J1cld by 
the company until t11p tirrw that plaintiff cpasc•d to 
make furOH·r deposits ,,-1~11 t-h<• Drv Goods Cow 
pany. 'l'lH•n thn funds fl'Om tllr• time~ O('posits were 
convPrt('(] into other as:-ets :"n(l tliOP.e othPr assd:<; 
camp into til(' hnm1:c: of t1w rccriv('l'. T,~knY;se ilnr-
ing tlw tim<> of tlw (}(•posits, or at ]past, as far b~'c·k 
as tlw m<>mor~· of t1H• ernployPC'H went, th0 Dr·y 
Good~~ Company harl in cash nt the slOT'(' from ctJy 
to dnv cnntinnou~'l" nnrl up mlfil the time of ilH' 
;>nnoiiihnent of tlw J'Pe(•ivPr a Rufficient amount of 
money 1 n nnv thP clahJls of tllP plaintiff nnd of 
\YnlkPr ~1nrl nf other rref<''T<'rl creditors and on tJ10 
mornin:.~· that thP rPcPiv<>r wa:-; appointed then• was 
nf ~'lleh mmwy at the store, an amount 0xecedinp; 
$10.000.00, in cn~h; n~on~ than pufTiciPut to havP pai(l 
thP claims of all 1l1e Pmployrc<'s in full and also 
nll otlwr prefenNl cbim~' agninst the receiver. 
ThPI'<' is apparently no cnnt('ntion on thl' part 
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of the appellant that the deposits made by plaintiff 
did not augment the assets of the Dry Goods Com-
pany coming into the hands of the receiver. There 
is no contention that the deposits were ever di-
verted from tho husin0ss of the company; that it 
was ever embezzled, stolen or dissipated. Th9y 
wont into thf~ stock in trad0 or other tangible assets 
oJ' the company. or applying tl1o presumptivp rul~ 
of evidence established by the cases in this court, 
the money remaine-d i11tact, nml is a part of the 
$10.000.000 coming into the hands of the receiver; 
or assuming that it \Vent into the stock in trade and 
that the stock in trade chanp;ed from time to time 
befon' coming- i.Hto tlle hand;;; of the rrceiver, tho 
proof that Ruch a:-;~:c•ts camr~ into the hands of the 
rccmver 1s a sufficiPnt tracing of the funds of U1e 
employees. 
'' \Vhere tru~t funds have been invested in a 
business and stock in trade, it is sufficient 
i(!cntification to point out the husiness as 
an 0ntity without showing that the stock 
and changing parts remain the same; for 
tho integrity a11d ich•ntity of a stock of 
goods, as such, rerrwin, so that it may he 
followed hv thP cP:->tui que trust, nlthoud1 
it is depl0ted by sales and replenished by 
pnrc11aseo; from time to time. If the trust0e 
uses tru'lt monc•y with l!is own in carrying 
on hi;;; business and rerJlenishing his stock 
of goods 1 tlw tru:;t fn'1f1 will he regarded 
as invested in the lm~innss as a whole and 
it may be suhj~·ct('d to tlw trust." 
65 C. J. page 972, paragraph 898. 
' ( AR a g·e1wral rule t hp cestni que trust's 
equitabl(• right of recovery is not destroyed 
hy r0ason of tho fact that the trustee has 
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so commingled the trust property \Vith his 
own property L~u.t it is impossible partic-
ularly to identify the trust property; for, 
unless the tmst property is such that it 
can be a::-;certained and separated from the 
rest the entire commingled fuud or prop-
erty will be tl'eated a:; subject to the trust, 
to the extent necE~ssary to make good the 
claim of the cestui que trust to funds 
traced to, and still found commingled in, 
the common fund, except in 80 far a8 the 
trustee may be able to distinguir;h and 
separate that which is his own." 
tiS C . .f., Pages ~)72-m3, Par. 80~). 
"If the trust property consisted of money, 
thP claim of the beneficiary of the trust 
fund may be prd'ened to the claims of 
other credi.tors, to the extent of the cash 
found among the a~:;;eL·. of the ill''olvcnt 
trustee at the tirue OJ' h!i; failure, Ullle~;s ic 
affinuatiV(']y appears that :·'uch ca:h n~;~'ets 
W<'l'e not part of the trust fund." Ninte v. 
Bauk of Commerce, 75 N. \V. 28, 29, 54 
Neb. 725. 
\Yherp tru::-;t mnrH'Y has gone into the gPn-
eral estate of a tru::-;t<~e, who afterward be-
coJnes insolvent, there is a presumption 
tlmt it remains Hwrein at his insolv(~Hcy, 
alld tlH' com·! will not say tlmt it c:mnot 
he traePd or hns wholly disappeared where 
tltr contrary may fairly he inferred. Lincoln 
v. Morrison 00 N. \\T. !105; (i4 Neb. 822; 57 
L. R. A. 885. 
\Vhere tru~t mmw~T is mingled with cash 
of the trustee, and tltt> tnu:tee becomes in-
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solvent, the cestui que trust is entitled to 
a preferential charge on cash funds re-
maining on hand at the time of the insol-
vency to the extent of the lowest amount 
to which the fund ·was reduced after the 
commingling, if it is not affirmatively 
shown that the trust funds do not constitute 
part of the cash assets. Crawford County 
v. Strawn, ]57 F. 49, 84 C. C. A. 553, 15 
L. R. A. N. S. 1100. 
Proof that the trustee has mingled the trust 
funds with his own and made payments 
thNeafter out of the common fund is, noth-
ing eiRe appearing, a fmfficicnt indentifica-
tion of thf' n)mainder of the fund coming 
into the hands of his perRonal representa-
tive, not exceeding the smallest amount the 
fund contained subsequent to the comming-
ling as trust property, under the legal 
pre>sumption that hp regarded the law and 
neither paid out of the trust fund nor in-
Vt>sted it in other property. Poisson v. 
Williams, 15 F. (2d) 582. 
Ignoring for the time bring the crrsh that came 
into the hands of the receiver at the time thnt he 
took possession of the insolvent estate and applying 
the rule set out in the above cited authorities, can 
tltere b~ :my doubt a:; to tl:e right of the plain1iff 
to h:we a preference adjudg,:;d in his favod If we 
assume that th€~ money went into the business and 
was invested ir. the purchase of stock of goods and 
tlw rcplt'nishing the same from time to time as tbe. 
necesf'.i ties of tfle bu:o:.iness required the trust fund 
will be regnrcled as invested in the business as n. 
whole and the whole of said business may be sub-
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jected to a trust. It must affirmatively appear that 
the trustee dissipated the trust funds as there is no 
presumption that he did, but the presumption is 
rather that he conserved the trust fund and pn-
perly invested it. 
State v. Bruce, 102 Pac., 831; 
17 Idaho, 1. 
'l'he evidence adduced by the defendant C~< 
cross-examination showed o11ly that the trustee com-
mingled the money received from the employees 
with its own; not that it diverted the money frnm 
the business, but used it, and the presumption is 
that he used it in suelt a way as is consistent with 
the trust. 
But the undisputed fact is, that a sum excee<l-
ing all the claims of the preferred creditors came 
iuto the hands of the reeeiver on the morning that 
he took posses:;;ion of the Pstate and that such an 
amount pxceeding the preferred claims, had bt~f'll 
kPpt in cash at thP ston~ from day to day contin-
uously for many yPars. 
Under the rule of the foregoing cases and the 
rulr aflopted by this court i11 a number of cases, t1w 
trust property, consi~'ting of money, the claim fJf 
the plaintiff may br preferred to the claim.:; of oth()J" 
creditors to the extent of the cash found among tl.e 
a'-'sds of the insolvent trnstee at the time of his 
fa.ilur(\ nnl(•ss it affirmativ(~ly appears that f'ueh 
rash assets werr not part of the trust fund. ']'here, 
has !wen no attrmpt on thf~ part of the appellant in 
thiR caR<' to sho·w that the depoRits of the plaintiff 
formrd no part of the cash coming into the hands 
of the receiver at the time of his appointment. 
Proof that the trustee has mingled the trust fu:r.rl 
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with l1is O\Yn, 11othing- else appearing, is a sufficient 
identification that it is part of the cash coming into 
the hands of the receiver at the time of his appoint-
ment, because of the legal presumption that the 
trustee regardrd the law and that he conserved the 
fund and kept faith with his cestui que trust. 
Counsel for the receiver, in the lower conrt, 
>ms quite frank in his statement to the court t(!at 
he :;;ympathizecl very strongly with the position of 
the plaintiff in his claim of preference, but fp}t 
hi_mself bound to protect what he deemed to be the 
legal 1·ights of other creditors. What is this sym-
pathetic feeling of counsel toward the plaintiff 1 
It is 110t the fellow-feeling of one person :similRrly 
situated to·ward another in his ovvn class. It is not 
the s~·mpathy of the poor for the poor, nor that of 
the charitably inclined toward the unfortunate. It is 
the f'ympathy of those lc~,rned in the law for one, 
not bc:cause of his mi:;;fortune, but because the cir-
cumstances of the caf~e appeals to the enlightened 
S('DSe of justice in the mind of counsel, and arouses 
his enlightened sympathy for any person sirnilarly 
situated to the plaintiff because a sense of justice 
compols l1im to the conclusion that the plaintiff 
.ought, in all fairnm:s, to be preferred in his churn 
'to that of the ordinnry err>ditor. ·what is this sym-
Jlathy but the en1ig·htmwd con~'cience of counsel and 
the same enlig-htened conc:cience that g11ided the 
Chancellor througlwut the ·whole dnvelopment of 
the ruk:-; of e(]uity in the Court of Chancery? 
Plaintiff did not deal with \Valker Brothers 
Dry Goods Cdmpany in the same way 'that the 
wholesale merchant dealt with the company. The 
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wholesaler dealt at ann 's-length for profit, counted, 
as a part of the ordinary risks of his business, a 
JJercentage of loss. Presumptively he was the equal 
of the Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company and 
able to, and did, take care ~f himself. 
But who is objecting to the judgment of 
tl1e lower 'court in this case'? 
1'he record does not disclose at whose in-· 
s1ance the appeal was taken. The record does Dot 
,disclose any authority on the part of the receiver 
to proHecute this appeal. ~Was the appeal pro~!"~ 
cuted by the receiver from a sense of duty to-ward 
the common cn~ditors as a whole? Or was the ap-
peal prosecuted at tiH' instance of a group of mer-
chants among the common creditors, or by some of 
the mOIH>y lenders; or hy a single common creditor 
on the gambler's chance of his own aggrandizement'? 
Tf a single monPy-lC'mlPr is tlJr~ power hel1ind this 
appeal, what SC'nse of justice and of equity compel:<. 
the conclu:oion that the money; d nsid0 hy the lower 
court to prot0ct its juflgnwnt rf'Jl(]prcd in fav0r of 
the plaintiff slHmld hr' appliPd to incrcasC' the divi-
dends to such money-lender, or an avaricious mer-
chant, as the case may lw. as ngainst thP claims cf 
J1l'0fN011CA of this plaintiff am1 of othc'r~ ~imilarl•· 
sihwterl ? 
AQ·nin th0 re~pondnnt calls the court's attcm-
~ion to 1lw YC'ry ahln h1'iC'f of Mr. 1\foy10 in tlw 
\Ya lkr>1' en ~C'. lH'rC'tofn rn n•fc>rrncl to, and to his dis-
cnss;0n of th0 rlochin0 of trf!cing the trust fund, 
hr,g-innin<; on nagc~ 57 nnd continuing· to the end of 
l!is hri<>f nnfl ar1onts that hriAf as a pnrt of 1'P-
spnnflnn1 's brief. 
In this caPe, tlw respnnrlc'nt respnctfu11y su1J-
rnits that a trust n'lationship existed lwt"'('Pll the 
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plaintiff and Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company, 
and that the trust fund held by Walker's has been 
cSufficiently identified as among the assets of the 
company coming into the hands of the receiver and 
that the plaintiff is entitled to receive, as a pre-· 
ferrcd creditor, his entire claim as awarded him 
by the lower court and .is entitled to an affirmance 
l£lf the judgment as rendered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
T. D. LEWIS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
